CIVPOL Web Site - Cnt: Africa: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

Anonymous writes "Continuation

An intense period followed of growing diplomatic pressure on Khartoum to accept United Nations Peacekeepers. For many months, the Government of Sudan rebuffed the UN charging that UN Peacekeepers were really an effort by Europeans to recolonize their country. Phony government orchestrated demonstrations in the streets of Khartoum protested against UN infringement of Sudan's sovereignty. Finally, in the summer of 2007, the impasse was broken when the United States and others agreed to compromise language for the UNPKO that the force would be "predominantly African." There is disagreement on what precisely that language means. Khartoum has claimed that it gave the Sudan government power to approve proposed troop contributing countries to UNAMID. This asserted veto power by Khartoum has contributed to the excruciatingly slow deployment of UNAMID to full strength as proposed peacekeepers from Nepal and Thailand were repeatedly disallowed.

Meanwhile, in addition to launching the Friends of UNAMID, the United States has been very active on other fronts to accelerate deployment. The United States' built African peacekeeper camps in Darfur have become UNAMID camps. The United States spent $100 million to train and equip peacekeepers for UNAMID from Rwanda, Senegal and other African countries. The United States has supplied transportation lift to get some of the peacekeepers to Darfur. And the United States, in coordination with the UN Secretariat, has been relentless in pressuring Khartoum to lift their many impediments to UNAMID deployment and operations.

Is UNMIS the answer to Sudan North/South peace and full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement? Is UNAMID the answer to the tragic genocide in slow motion in Darfur? Absolutely NOT! But UNMIS and UNAMID are each an answer. Each of these UNPKOs are making the situations better. Each is contributing to an improved situation on the ground and contributing to some improved stability for peace to have a chance. Are they worth the cost, the personnel, the risks they assume? That's a difficult decision which with UNMIS and UNAMID, as in all UNPKOs, is a case by case decision that warrants reconsideration as events unfold.

General Observations

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, like all mechanisms of foreign and security policy, are imperfect. There are times UNPKOs are very useful in advancing United States interests. In general UNPKOs deserve our support. However, there is ample room for improvement and the United States as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council and as the largest financial contributor to UN Peacekeeping budgets must be a leader and forward leaning in working to reform and improve UN Peacekeeping Operations.

One, the United States must be realistic about what a UNPKO can do, the limits of its capacity. There are limits of available peacekeepers from Troop Contributing Countries. There are limits of available equipment such as helicopters with night vision. There are limits to the political leverage and influence of the United Nations, especially when dealing with deeply entrenched sovereign governments. These limits and others must be understood, acknowledged, and be part of the analysis of whether or not to support authorization of any new UNPKO.

Two, the United States must be steely-eyed and crystal clear in assessing the real support within the UN Security Council for any new UNPKO. Both political will and material support is required not only at the launch of a new UNPKO but it must be sustained throughout. Especially if one or more of the Security Council Permanent Members have direct interests in a conflict or with one party of a conflict, the effectiveness of the UNPKO will be compromised on various fronts. In such situations the likelihood of success is substantially compromised.

Three, the United States should not be so anxious to launch a UNPKO that it accepts inadequate mandates or too small a force size to get the job done. Nor can it accept infringement on UNPKO's composition, freedom of movement and so on. Better not to approve a UNPKO than to launch one inadequate to the assignment.

Four, UNPKOs ought not be immortal. Some UNPKO interpositional forces such as in Cypress and Western Sahara were deployed in acute situations that, over time, have calmed down. The dispute is resolvable but the pain on either side is not acute enough to compel compromise. The status quo may not be preferable, but it is acceptable. The UNPKO allows a comfort to set in. Unresolved issues remain unresolved because, due to the UNPKO, they don't need to be resolved. That's rubbish. The parties should be forced to resolve their problems and move on. UNPKOs ought not become nannies allowing complacency to set in and issues to remain indefinitely unresolved.

Five, UNPKOs must be more flexible. They must be better at adapting to the situation and adjusting. For example, helicopters with night vision might be preferable to transport UNPKO equipment and personnel and to aid peacekeepers under attack. However, if unavailable, helicopter without night vision are better than no helicopters. For example, tragically last year some UNAMID peacekeepers were attacked and some killed. Attack helicopters without night vision had been available for months, but UNAMID's position was they did not meet specifications, so they refused the offer. For the UNAMID peacekeepers under attack during daylight, the available helicopters certainly would have been welcome.

Six, recognize that in difficult environments a lead dog can be very helpful. The United Kingdom played that lead role with peacekeeping in Sierra Leone and France in Cote D'Ivoire.

Seven, there needs to be reform of the work program of the UN's Fifth Committee. That body spends the entire year on the UN Regular Budget of approximately $3 billion. However, it devotes only the month of May to the UN Peacekeeping budget of almost $8 billion.

Eight, UN Peacekeeping Operations, like other UN bodies and mechanisms, should conform to the highest standards of procurement and management. Unfortunately, such standards have not always been met. To insure appropriate oversight and accountability, the UN Office of Internal Oversight Service (OIOS) should be supported politically and financially. It should be urged to deal appropriately and expeditiously with the cases referred by the Procurement Task Force and a permanent appointment should be made for the person in charge of investigations.

Nine, progress must be made to "standardize" UNPKO equipment, especially common communications equipment system wide. Ten, often

the most important determinant of a successful UNPKO is the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and the Deputy SRSG. The personality, energy, drive, political skill, commitment, innovation and overall talent of the SRSG and Deputy SRSG are absolutely critical. Nonetheless, the capabilities of SRSG range from outstanding personalities like Laktar Brahimi and Sergio Vieira de Mello to the merely adequate to the buffoonish. Geographic consideration, cronyism, and a general lack of rigor in the selection of SRSGs and Deputy SRSGs must end. Both the Secretary General and the Security Council must change past sloppy, haphazard selection practices and slack accountability and reform to provide the sort of selection process and oversight of these posts warranted by their importance and the seriousness of their mission.

Eleven, similarly UNPKO Force Commanders often are picked because of nationality and politics, not competence. This too must end. It's a deadly serious business and should be treated as such.

Twelve, there should be common training for UNPKOs whatever their country of origin: a common procedure, manual and practice.

Thirteen, progress has been made but more is required for UNPKO activity to be integrated with the World Food Program and other important UN humanitarian agencies active in conflict and post-conflict arenas.

Fourteen, there needs to be better training and monitoring of UNPKOs on human rights – especially exploitation of women and children, and HIV-AIDS.

Let me note that under the supervision of United Nations Under Secretaries General Alain Le Roy and Susana Malcorra the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support this month published an excellent 46 page Non-Paper titled A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping. It contains some of the recommendations I have mentioned and others to improve UN Peacekeeping Operations. Many critical issues are raised. I commend it to the members of this Committee and your staff.

Conclusion

I close where I began my testimony. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations can be very useful in advancing United States interests and in helping make the world safer and more secure. UNPKOs deserve support. But, at the same time, reform is needed to improve their operations. And, most important, hard eyed realism is required of the United States in the Security Council and discrimination is necessary on whether or not to approve UNPKOs. It is not the place to off load problems. It is not the place to overload the mechanism's capacity. It is not the place to approve missions for which our or other's political will equivocates or toward which inadequate resources will be deployed. The most critical UNPKO mistakes are often in their inception and launch. Passing a problem to a UNPKO is not solving a problem. It is only a beginning of a solution that requires political and material support and efficient, effective, and persistent leadership and very hard work on the ground.

Thank you. "